经济学院学术报告之杨金强(二)

2017-12-04

报告题目 Liquidity and Risk Management: Coordinating Investment and Compensation Policies

报告时间:2017年12月14日(星期四)11:00-11:45

报告地点:翡翠湖校区科教A楼第一会议室

报 告 人:杨金强教授

工作单位:上海财经大学金融学院

举办单位:经济学院

报告人简介:

     杨金强,上海财经大学金融学院教授,博士生导师,证券期货系主任。湖南大学和哥伦比亚大学联合培养博士,教育部首批“长江学者”青年学者,国家优秀青年基金获得者,教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”获得者, 霍英东教育基金获得者,上海市首批青年拔尖人才,上海市晨光学者。近年来主要致力于动态公司金融和资产定价的理论研究。已发表或接受待发表论文37篇学术期刊论文,国际顶尖金融学和经济学期刊论文5篇,其中包括3篇Journal of Financial Economics,1篇Review of Financial Studies和1篇Journal of Economic Theory;其他国际知名金融学和经济学SSCI期刊论文20篇;国内权威期刊论文12篇,其中包括5篇《经济研究》和2篇《管理科学学报》。论文连续多年入选国际顶级金融学年会(AFA、WFA、EFA)。

报告简介:

    We study the corporate finance implications of risky inalienable human capital for a risk-averse entrepreneur. We show how liquidity and risk management policies coordinate investment and executive compensation policies to efficiently retain managerial talent and honor corporate liabilities. The firm optimally balances the goal of attaining mean-variance efficiency for the entrepreneur’s net worth and that of preserving financial slack. The former is the main consideration when the firm is flush with liquidity and the latter is the only consideration when the firm has depleted its financial slack. We show that relative to the first-best, the entrepreneur’s net worth is over-exposed to idiosyncratic risk and under-exposed to systematic risk. These distortions are greater the more financially constrained the firm is.

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